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Temporal STIT logic and its application to normative reasoning
Emiliano Lorini∗
IRIT-CNRS, Toulouse, France
I present a variant of STIT with time, called T-STIT (Temporal STIT), interpreted in
standard Kripke semantics. On the syntactic level, T-STIT is nothing but the extension
of atemporal individual STIT by: (i) the future tense and past tense operators, and (ii)
the operator of group agency for the grand coalition (the coalition of all agents). A
sound and complete axiomatisation for T-STIT is given. Moreover, it is shown that
T-STIT supports reasoning about interesting normative concepts such as the concepts
of achievement obligation and commitment.
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1. Introduction
STIT logic (the logic of Seeing to it That; Belnap, Perloff, & Xu, 2001) is one of the most
prominent formal accounts of agency. It is the logic of sentences of the form ‘the agent i
sees to it that ϕ is true’. Horty (2001) extends the STIT logic of Belnap et al. (2001) with
operators of group agency in order to express sentences of the form ‘the group of agents C
sees to it that ϕ is true’. Following Lorini and Schwarzentruber (2011), one might use the
terms ‘individual STIT logic’ and ‘group STIT logic’ to designate respectively the STIT
logic of Belnap et al. (2001) (in which only the actions of agents are described) and Horty’s
(2001) variant of STIT logic (in which both actions of agents and joint actions of groups
are represented).
The original semantics for STIT given by Belnap et al. (2001) is defined in terms
of BT+AC structures: branching-time structures (BT) augmented by agent choice func-
tions (AC). A BT structure is made of a set of moments and a tree-like ordering over
them. An AC for a certain agent i is a function mapping each moment m into a parti-
tion of the set of histories passing through that moment, a history h being a maximal
set of linearly ordered moments and the equivalence classes of the partition being the
possible choices for agent i at moment m. As shown by Balbiani, Herzig, and Troquard
(2008), Lorini and Schwarzentruber (2011), and Herzig and Schwarzentruber (2008), how-
ever, both ‘atemporal individual STIT’ (i.e., individual STIT without tense operators in the
object language) axiomatised by Belnap et al. (2001, Chapter 17), and ‘atemporal group
STIT’ (i.e., group STIT without tense operators) can be ‘simulated’ in standard Kripke
semantics. A similar idea is proposed by Kooi and Tamminga (2008), who introduce the
concept of ‘consequential model’. Consequential models are equivalent to the Kripke
atemporal group STIT models used by Herzig and Schwarzentruber (2008) and Lorini
and Schwarzentruber (2011), in which the authors abstract away from the branching-time
account of STIT.
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The present article goes beyond previous work on atemporal STIT by presenting a
variant of STIT logic with time interpreted in standard Kripke semantics and by providing
a sound and complete axiomatisation for this logic. I call this variant of STIT logic T-STIT
(Temporal STIT). On the syntactic level, the logic T-STIT is nothing but the extension of
atemporal individual STIT by: (i) the future tense and past tense operators, and (ii) the
operator of group agency in Horty’s (2001) sense for the grand coalition (the coalition of
all agents).
The main motivation of this work is that past research on the mathematical properties
of STIT (e.g., completeness and decidability) has mainly focused on atemporal STIT, while
extensions of STIT by tense operators are far less well studied and understood. The interest
of studying them is that they offer valuable formal languages for representing a variety of
normative concepts such as commitment (Bentahar, Moulin, Meyer, & Chaib-draa, 2004;
Desai, Narendra, & Singh, 2008; Singh, 2008) and achievement obligation (i.e., the obliga-
tion to perform a given action at some point in the future; Broersen, Dastani, & van der Torre,
2003; Governatori & Rotolo, 2010) that have an intrinsic temporal nature. These concepts
are fundamental for understanding normative relationships between individuals in a society
and have become useful abstractions for the design of multi-agent systems since they can
be used to model a variety of interactive situations like contracts, agreements, negotiation,
dialogue, and argumentation.
The rest of the article is organised as follows. In Section 2, the logic T-STIT is presented
and a complete axiomatisation for this logic is given. An application of T-STIT to the
formalisation of normative concepts such as achievement obligation and commitment is
given in Section 3. It is shown that that T-STIT allows us to capture subtle temporal
properties of these normative concepts such as persistence (i.e., the conditions under which
a commitment persists over time). In Section 4, related work on STIT logic is discussed.
2. A STIT logic with time
This section presents the syntax and a Kripke-style semantics for T-STIT (Subsections 2.1
and 2.2). An axiomatisation of T-STIT is provided in Subsection 2.3, while in Subsection
2.4 it is proved that this axiomatisation is sound and complete with respect to the given
semantics.
In the logic T-STIT, the so-called Chellas’s STIT operators (Chellas, 1992) are taken as
primitive operators of agency. As pointed out by Xu (1998) and Horty and Belnap (1995),
so-called deliberative STIT operators and Chellas’s STIT operators are interdefinable and
just differ in the choice of primitive operators.
2.1. Syntax
Assume a countably infinite set of propositional atoms denoting basic facts Atm = {p, q, . . .}
and a finite set of agents Agt = {1, . . . , n}.
The language LT-STIT(Atm,Agt) of the logic T-STIT is the set of formulas defined by
the following BNF:
ϕ:: = p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | [i]ϕ | [Agt]ϕ | ϕ | Gϕ | Hϕ
where p ranges over Atm and i ranges over Agt. The other Boolean constructions ⊤, ⊥, ∨,
→ and ↔ are defined from ¬ and ∧ in the standard way.
Operators of the form [i] are Chellas’s STIT operators. The formula [i]ϕ captures the
fact that ϕ is guaranteed by a present action of agent i , and has to be read ‘agent i sees to
it that ϕ regardless of what the other agents do’. I shorten the reading of [i]ϕ to ‘agent i
sees to it that ϕ’. The crucial aspect of STIT theory is that an agent i’s action is described in
terms of the result that agent i brings about by her acting. For example, i’s action of killing
another agent j is described by the fact that i sees to it that j is dead. I define the dual of
the operator [i] as follows: 〈i〉ϕ def= ¬[i]¬ϕ.
[Agt] is a group STIT operator which captures the fact that ϕ is guaranteed by a present
choice of all agents, and has to be read ‘all agents see to it that ϕ by acting together’. The
dual of the operator [Agt] is defined as expected: 〈Agt〉ϕ def= ¬[Agt]¬ϕ. The modal operator
[Agt] will be fundamental in Section 2.2 in order to axiomatise a basic property relating
action and time studied in STIT: the so-called property of no choice between undivided
histories (Belnap et al., 2001, Chapter 7).
ϕ stands for ‘ϕ is true regardless of what every agent does’ or ‘ϕ is true no matter
what the agents do’ or simply ‘ϕ is necessarily true’. I define the dual of  as follows:
♦ϕ
def
= ¬¬ϕ. Note that the operators [i] and ♦ can be combined in order to express what
agents can do: ♦[i]ϕ means ‘agent i can see to it that ϕ’. Moreover, the operators [i] and
 can be combined in order define the deliberative STIT operators [i dstit: ] studied by
Horty and Belnap (1995): [i dstit: ϕ] def= [i]ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ.
Finally, G and H are tense operators that are respectively used to express facts that are
always true in the strict future and facts that are always true in the past. Gϕ means ‘ϕ will
always be true in the future’ and Hϕ means ‘ϕ has always been true in the past’. I define
the dual of the future tense operator G as follows: Fϕ def= ¬G¬ϕ. Fϕ means ‘ϕ will be
true at some point in the future’. Moreover, I define the dual of the past tense operator H as
follows: Pϕ def= ¬H¬ϕ. Pϕ means ‘ϕ has been true at some point in the past’.
The following abbreviations will also be convenient:
G∗ϕ def= ϕ ∧Gϕ;
F∗ϕ def= ¬G∗¬ϕ.
G∗ϕ stands for ‘ϕ is true in the present and will always be true’, whereas F∗ϕ stands
for ‘ϕ is true in the present or will be true at some point in the future’.
2.2. A Kripke semantics for STIT logic with time
The basic notion in the semantics is the notion of a temporal Kripke STIT model that is
nothing but a multi-relational Kripke model with special constraints on the accessibility
relations. For notational convenience, in what follows I am going to use the following
abbreviations. Given a set of elements W , an arbitrary binary relation R on W and an
element w in W , let R(w) = {v ∈ W |(w, v) ∈ R}. Moreover, given two binary relations
R1 and R2 on W let R1 ◦ R2 be the standard operation of composition between binary
relations. Temporal Kripke STIT models can be seen as extensions of Zanardo’s (1996)
Ockhamist frames by a choice component, i.e., by accessibility relations for the individual
choices of the agents and an accessibility relation for the collective choice of the grand
coalition Agt.
Definition 1 (Temporal Kripke STIT model). The class of temporal Kripke STIT models
includes all tuples M = (W,R, {Ri |i ∈ Agt},RAgt,RG,RH,V) where:
• W is a nonempty set of possible worlds;
• R, every Ri and RAgt are equivalence relations between worlds in W such that:
(C1) Ri ⊆ R;
(C2) for all u1, . . . , un ∈ W : if (ui , u j ) ∈ R for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} then⋂
1≤i≤n Ri (ui ) 6= ∅;
(C3) for all w ∈ W : RAgt(w) =
⋂
i∈Agt Ri (w);
• RG and RH are binary relations between worlds in W such that RG is serial and
transitive, RH is the inverse relation of RG (i.e., RH = R−1G = {(w, v)|(v,w)
∈ RG}), and:
(C4) for all w, v, u ∈ W : if v, u ∈ RG(w) then u ∈ RG(v) or v ∈ RG(u) or
u = v;
(C5) for all w, v, u ∈ W : if v, u ∈ RH(w) then u ∈ RH(v) or v ∈ RH(u) or
u = v;
(C6) RG ◦R ⊆ RAgt ◦RG;
(C7) for all w ∈ W : if v ∈ R(w) then v 6∈ RG(w);
• V : Atm −→ 2W is a valuation function for atomic formulas.
The valuation function V is used to identify those states in a model in which a given
atomic proposition is true. Specifically, w ∈ V(p) means that p is true at world w.
R(w) is the set of worlds that are alternative to the worldw. Following the Ockhamist’s
view of time (Prior, 1967; Thomason, 1984; Zanardo, 1996), I call the equivalence classes
induced by the equivalence relation R moments.1 The set of all moments in the model M
is denoted by Mom and the elements in Mom are denoted by m,m′, . . ..
RG(w) defines the set of worlds that are in the strict future of world w, where the strict
future does not include the present. RH(w) defines the set of worlds that are in the past of
worldw. The Constraint C7 ensures that if two worlds belong to the same moment then one
of them cannot be in the future of the other. Since the relation R is reflexive, the Constraint
C7 implies the irreflexivity of the relation RG, i.e., for all w ∈ W we have w 6∈ RG(w).
The fact that the relation RG is transitive and irreflexive just means that it is a strict partial
order on the set W . The Constraint C4 ensures that time is connected towards the future,
while the Constraint C5 ensures that time is connected towards the past.
Let T (w) = RH(w) ∪ {w} ∪ RG(w) be the set of worlds that are temporally related
with world w. The fact that the relation RG is irreflexive and transitive together with the
Constraints C4 and C5 ensure that RG is a strict linear (or total) order on the set T (w). For
every world w in W , I call the linearly ordered set (T (w),RG) the history going through
w. For notational convenience, I write hw instead of (T (w),RG). Note that, because of the
seriality of the relation RG, every history hw is infinite.
This highlights that there is a one-to-one correspondence between worlds and histories,
as for every world w there exists a unique history going through it. In other words, one can
interchangeably use the term ‘world’ and ‘history going through a certain world’ without
lost of generality.As every world in a model is identified with a unique history going through
it, the equivalence relation R can also be understood as an equivalence relation between
historic alternatives: (w, v) ∈ R means that the history going through v is alternative to
the history going through w.
From the temporal relation RG over worlds in W , we can define the following relation<
over moments in Mom, where m < m′ means that moment m′ is in the strict future of moment
m.
Definition 2 (Ordering of moments). For all m,m′ ∈ Mom: let m < m′ if and only if
there are w ∈ m and v ∈ m′ such that (w, v) ∈ RG.
For every world w, the set Ri (w) identifies agent i’s actual choice at w, that is to
say, the set of all alternatives that is forced by agent i’s actual choice at w. Because of the
one-to-one correspondence between worlds and histories, one can also identify agent i’s
actual choice at w with the set of histories {hv : v ∈ Ri (w)}. In other words, in T-STIT an
agent chooses among different sets of histories.
Constraint C1 in Definition 1 just means that an agent can only choose among possible
alternatives. This constraint ensures that, for every world w, the equivalence relation Ri
induces a partition of the set R(w). An element of this partition is a choice that is possible
(or available) for agent i at w.
Constraint C2 expresses the so-called assumption of independence of agents or inde-
pendence of choices: if R1(u1) is a possible choice for agent 1, R2(u2) is a possible choice
for agent 2,…, Rn(un) is a possible choice for agent n, then their intersection is nonempty.
More intuitively, this means that agents can never be deprived of choices due to the choices
made by other agents.
For every world w, the set RAgt(w) identifies the actual choice of group Agt at w –
that is to say, the set of all alternatives that is forced by the collective choice of all agents at
w. Constraint C3 just says that the set of alternatives that is forced by the collective choice
of all agents at w is equal to the pointwise intersection of the sets of alternatives that are
forced by the individual choices of the agents in Agt at w. In other words, the choice of a
group corresponds to the intersection of the choices of the individuals in the group. This
corresponds to the notion of joint action proposed by Horty (2001), where the joint action
of a group is described in terms of the result that the agents in the group bring about by
acting together.
The Constraint C6 expresses a basic relation between action and time: if v is in the future
of w and u and v are in the same moment, then there exists an alternative z in the collective
choice of all agents at w such that u is in the future of z. This constraint corresponds to the
property of no choice between undivided histories given in STIT logic (Belnap et al., 2001,
Chapter 7). It captures the idea that if two histories come together in some future moment
then, in the present, each agent does not have a choice between these two histories. This
implies that if an agent can choose between two histories at a later stage then she does not
have a choice between them in the present. The Constraint C6 is crucial in order to prove
that the relation < defined above is a tree-like ordering of the moments in Mom.
Proposition 3. The relation < satisfies the following four properties for all m,m ′,m′′ ∈
Mom:
(Irreflexivity) m ≮ m;
(Transitivity) if m < m′ and m′ < m′′ then m < m′′;
(Asymmetry) if m < m′ then m′ ≮ m;
(No backward branching) if m′ < m and m′′ < m then m′ < m′′ or m′′ < m′ or m′ = m′′.
Proof. The irreflexivity of< follows from the Constraint C7. Indeed, suppose that m < m.
This implies that there are w, v ∈ W such that (w, v) ∈ R and (w, v) ∈ RG. But this is
in contradiction with the Constraint C7.
Transitivity of< follows from the transitivity of the relationRG and from the Constraints
C1, C3 and C6. Suppose that m < m′ and m′ < m′′. Therefore, for some arbitrary
worlds w1, w2, w3, w4 we have w1 ∈ m, w2, w3 ∈ m′, w4 ∈ m′′, w2 ∈ RG(w1) and
w4 ∈ RG(w3). By the Constraint C6, it follows that there is w5 ∈ RAgt(w1) such that
w3 ∈ RG(w5). The Constraints C1 and C3 together imply that RAgt ⊆ R. Hence, there
is w5 ∈ m such that w3 ∈ RG(w5). Thus, by the transitivity of RG, there is w5 ∈ m such
that w4 ∈ RG(w5). It follows that m < m′′.
The asymmetry of < follows from its irreflexivity.
No backward branching follows from the Constraints C5 and C6. Suppose that m ′ < m
and m′′ < m. Therefore, for some arbitrary worlds w1, w2, w3, w4 we have w1, w2 ∈ m,
w3 ∈ m′, w4 ∈ m′′, w3 ∈ RH(w1) and w4 ∈ RH(w2). By the Constraint C6, it follows that
there is w5 ∈ RAgt(w3) such that w5 ∈ RH(w2). Thus, since RAgt ⊆ R, there is w5 ∈ m′
such that w5 ∈ RH(w2). Moreover, by the Constraint C5 and the fact that w4 ∈ RH(w2), it
follows that there is w5 ∈ m′ such that w5 ∈ RH(w4) or w4 ∈ RH(w5) or w4 = w5. Since
w4 ∈ m′′, the latter implies that m′ < m′′ or m′′ < m′ or m′ = m′′. 
Another interesting property of temporal Kripke STIT models that follows from the
Constraints C6 and C7 is the so-called property of past isomorphism (PI), which is similar
to the property of past isomorphism of Zanardo’s (1996) Ockhamist frames.
Proposition 4. For allw, v ∈ W , if (w, v) ∈ R then there exists an order-isomorphism
f between RH(w) and RH(v) such that, for all u ∈ RH(w), (u, f (u)) ∈ RAgt .2
Proof. First of all note that, by Constraints C1 and C3, RAgt ⊆ R.
Assume (w, v) ∈ R. By Constraint C7 and the fact that RAgt ⊆ R, every world has
at most one RAgt-equivalent in any history and, hence, by Constraint C6, every world u
such that u ∈ RH(w) has exactly one RAgt-equivalent in RH(v). Therefore, the restriction
of RAgt to the set RH(w)×RH(v) is an order-preserving bijective function. 
Given a temporal Kripke STIT model M = (W,R, {Ri |i ∈ Agt},RAgt,RG,RH,V),
a world w and a formula ϕ, I write M, w |= ϕ to mean that ϕ is true at world w in M . The
truth conditions of formulas are then defined as follows:
M, w |= p ⇐⇒ w ∈ V(p)
M, w |= ¬ϕ ⇐⇒ M, w 6|= ϕ
M, w |= ϕ ∧ ψ ⇐⇒ M, w |= ϕ and M, w |= ψ
M, w |= ϕ ⇐⇒ ∀v ∈ R(w) : M, v |= ϕ
M, w |= [i]ϕ ⇐⇒ ∀v ∈ Ri (w) : M, v |= ϕ
M, w |= [Agt]ϕ ⇐⇒ ∀v ∈ RAgt(w) : M, v |= ϕ
M, w |= Gϕ ⇐⇒ ∀v ∈ RG(w) : M, v |= ϕ
M, w |= Hϕ ⇐⇒ ∀v ∈ RH(w) : M, v |= ϕ
Example 5. Figure 1 provides an example that clearly illustrates the semantics of
T-STIT. At world w in the temporal Kripke STIT model M represented in the figure, agent
2 sees to it that p is true (i.e., M, w |= [2]p). Indeed, p holds at every world in agent 2’s
choice at w. Moreover, at w agent 1 sees to it that p or q is true (i.e., M, w |= [1](p ∨ q))
because either p or q hold at every world in agent 1’s choice at w. Finally, at w the group
{1, 2} sees to it that q will be true at some point in the future (i.e., M, w |= [{1, 2}]Fq)
because q holds at some future point of every history in the group {1, 2}’s choice at w.
Given a T-STIT formula ϕ, I say that ϕ is T-STIT valid, denoted by |=T-STIT ϕ, if and
only if for every temporal Kripke STIT model M and for every world w in M we have
M, w |= ϕ. I say that ϕ is satisfiable in T-STIT if and only if ¬ϕ is not T-STIT valid.
The following proposition provides an example of interesting T-STIT validities.
Proposition 6. The following two formulas are T-STIT valid:
G♦G∗ϕ → 〈Agt〉Gϕ
G♦(G∗ϕ ∧ F∗ψ)→ 〈Agt〉(Gϕ ∧ Fψ)
Figure 1. Example of temporal Kripke STIT model.
Note: The worldw is the actual world. Choices of agent 1 are represented by columns whereas choices
of agent 2 are represented by rows. Choices of the group {1, 2} are represented by dotted rectangles.
The temporal relation RG is represented by the arrows.
Proof. I only prove the first validity, as the second one can be proved in a similar way. I
prove its contrapositive, namely I prove that [Agt]Fϕ → FF∗ϕ is T-STIT valid. Suppose
M, w |= [Agt]Fϕ. This means that:
(A) for all v ∈ RAgt(w) there is u ∈ RG(v) such that M, u |= ϕ.
Let
Aϕw =
{
u|M, u |= ϕ and ∃v ∈ RAgt(w) such that u ∈ RG(v)
}
and let
PAϕw =
{
u¯ ∈ RG(w)|∃u ∈ Aϕw such that (u¯, u) ∈ R
}
.
Moreover let
NBϕw = RG(w) \
⋃
u¯∈PAϕw
RG(u¯).
I am going to show that NBϕw 6= ∅. Suppose NBϕw = ∅. Thus, there exists u¯ ∈ PAϕw such
that RG(w) = RG(u¯). Hence, by Constraint C5, there exists u¯ ∈ PA
ϕ
w such that w = u¯.
The latter implies that there exists u¯ ∈ RG(w) such that w = u¯, which is in contradiction
with the fact that RG is irreflexive.
Take any world z ∈ NBϕw. Clearly, z ∈ RG(w). I am going to show that
(B) for all v ∈ R(z) either M, v |= ϕ or there is u ∈ RG(v) such that M, u |= ϕ.
Suppose v ∈ R(z). From z ∈ RG(w), by Constraint C6 and the previous observation
(A), we have that there are z′, v′ such that z′ ∈ RAgt(w), v ∈ RG(z′), v′ ∈ RG(z′) and
M, v′ |= ϕ. Moreover, by Constraint C4, v′ ∈ RG(v) or v ∈ RG(v′) or v = v′. I am going
to show that v = v′ or v′ ∈ RG(v) by reductio ad absurdum.
Suppose v ∈ RG(v′). Clearly, v′ ∈ A
ϕ
w. From z′ ∈ RAgt(w), v ∈ R(z), z ∈ RG(w),
v ∈ RG(z′), v′ ∈ RG(z′) and v ∈ RG(v′), by Proposition 4, it follows that there exists
v¯′ ∈ RG(w) such that v′ ∈ RAgt(v¯′) and z ∈ RG(v¯′). Since RAgt ⊆ R and v′ ∈ A
ϕ
w,
the latter implies that there exists v¯′ ∈ RG(w) such that v¯′ ∈ PA
ϕ
w, v
′ ∈ RAgt(v¯
′) and
z ∈ RG(v¯′). v¯′ ∈ PA
ϕ
w and z ∈ RG(v¯′) together imply that z 6∈ NB
ϕ
w. But this is in
contradiction with the initial hypothesis that z ∈ NBϕw.
By the previous item (B), we have that M, z |= F∗ϕ. Since z ∈ RG(w), M, w |=
FF∗ϕ. 
2.3. Axiomatisation
Figure 2 contains a complete axiomatisation with respect to the class of temporal Kripke
STIT models.
Figure 2. Axiomatisation of T-STIT.
This includes all tautologies of classical propositional calculus (PC) as well as modus
ponens (MP). Moreover, we have all the principles of the normal modal logic S5 for every
operator [i], for the operator [Agt] and for the operator , all principles of the normal
modal logic KD4 for the future tense operator G and all principles of the normal modal
logic K for the past tense operator H. That is, we have Axiom K for each operator: (ϕ∧
(ϕ → ψ)) → ψ with  ∈ {,G,H, [Agt]} ∪ {[i]|i ∈ Agt}. We have Axiom D for the
future tense modality G:¬(Gϕ∧G¬ϕ). We have Axiom 4 for, G, [Agt] and for every [i]:
ϕ → ϕ with  ∈ {, [Agt],G} ∪ {[i]|i ∈ Agt}. Furthermore, we have Axiom T for
, [Agt] and for every [i]:ϕ → ϕ with ∈ {, [Agt]}∪{[i]|i ∈ Agt}. We have Axiom B
for , [Agt] and for every [i]: ϕ → ¬¬ϕ with  ∈ {, [Agt]} ∪ {[i]|i ∈ Agt}. Finally
we have the rule of necessitation for each modal operator: ϕ
ϕ
with ∈ {, [Agt],G,H}∪
{[i]|i ∈ Agt}. In what follows, I write ⊢T-STIT ϕ if ϕ is a T-STIT theorem. Moreover, I say
that ϕ is T-STIT consistent if 6⊢T-STIT ¬ϕ.
( → i) and (AIA) are the two central principles in Xu’s (1998) axiomatisation of
the Chellas’s STIT operators [i]. According to Axiom ( → i), if ϕ is true regardless of
what every agent does, then every agent sees to it that ϕ. In other words, an agent brings
about those facts that are inevitable.3 According to Axiom (i → Agt), all agents bring about
together what each of them brings about individually.
We have principles for the tense operators and for the relationship between time and
action. (ConnectedG) and (ConnectedH) are the basic axioms for the linearity of the future
and the linearity of the past (Goldblatt, 1992). (ConvG,H) and (ConvH,G) are the basic
interaction axioms between future and past of minimal tense logic according to which
‘what is, will always have been’ and ‘what is, has always been going to be’.
Axiom (NCUH) establishes a fundamental relationship between action and time and
corresponds to the semantic constraint of ‘no choice between undivided histories’ over
temporal Kripke STIT models (Constraint C6): if in some future world ϕ will be possible
then the actual collective choice of all agents will possibly result in a state in which ϕ is true.
(IRR) is a variant of the well-known Gabbay’s irreflexivity rule that has been widely
used in the past for proving completeness results for different kinds of temporal logic in
which time is supposed to be irreflexive (see, e.g., Gabbay, Hodkinson, & Reynolds, 1994;
Reynolds, 2003; von Kutschera, 1997; Zanardo, 1996). The idea is that the special kind of
irreflexivity for the relation RG expressed by the Constraint C7 in Definition 1, although
not definable in terms of an axiom, can be characterised in an alternative sense by means of
the rule (IRR). This rule is perhaps more comprehensible if we consider its contrapositive:
if p does not occur in ϕ and ϕ is T-STIT consistent, then¬p∧(Gp∧Hp)∧ϕ is T-STIT
consistent.
Theorem 7. The set of T-STIT validities is completely axiomatised by the principles given
in Figure 2.
2.4. Proof of Theorem 7
It is a routine task to show that the axioms given in Figure 2 are valid with respect to the
class of temporal Kripke T-STIT models and that the rules of inference preserve validity.
Thus, if ϕ is a T-STIT theorem then ϕ is T-STIT valid.
I am going to prove that if ϕ is T-STIT consistent then ϕ is T-STIT satisfiable. The proof
is divided into two steps.
First of all, I introduce the class of superadditive temporal Kripke STIT models. While
in the temporal Kripke STIT models the collective choice of the grand coalition is equal
to the pointwise intersection of the individual choices, in superadditive temporal Kripke
STIT models the collective choice of the grand coalition is merely included in the pointwise
intersection of the individual choices. I prove that the logic T-STIT does not distinguish
the semantics in terms of temporal Kripke STIT models from the more ‘liberal’ semantics
in terms of superadditive temporal Kripke STIT models. That is to say, the set of validities
with respect to the class of temporal Kripke STIT models is equal to the set of validities
with respect to the class of superadditive temporal Kripke STIT models (Lemma 9).
Secondly, I prove that the set of validities in the class of superadditive temporal Kripke
STIT models is completely axiomatised by the principles given in Figure 2 (Lemma 10).
Theorem 7 directly follows from Lemma 10 and Lemma 9.
Let me define the class of superadditive temporal Kripke STIT models.
Definition 8 (Superadditive temporal Kripke STIT model). The class of superadditive
temporal Kripke STIT models includes all tuples M = (W,R, {Ri |i ∈ Agt},RAgt,RG,
RH,V) where:
• W is a nonempty set of possible worlds;
• R, every Ri and RAgt are equivalence relations between worlds in W such that:
(C1) Ri ⊆ R;
(C2) for all u1, . . . , un ∈ W : if (ui , u j ) ∈ R for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} then⋂
1≤i≤n Ri (ui ) 6= ∅;
(C3∗) for all w ∈ W : RAgt(w) ⊆
⋂
i∈Agt Ri (w);
• RG and RH are binary relations between worlds in W such that RG is serial and
transitive, RH is the inverse relation of RG, and:
(C4) for all w, v, u ∈ W : if v, u ∈ RG(w) then u ∈ RG(v) or v ∈ RG(u) or
u = v;
(C5) for all w, v, u ∈ W : if v, u ∈ RH(w) then u ∈ RH(v) or v ∈ RH(u) or
u = v;
(C6) RG ◦R ⊆ RAgt ◦RG;
(C7) for all w ∈ W : if v ∈ R(w) then v 6∈ RG(w);
• V : Atm −→ 2W is a valuation function for atomic formulas.
The only difference between the class of temporal Kripke STIT models and superadditive
temporal Kripke STIT models is in the Constraint C3∗.
Lemma 9. Let ϕ be a formula in LT-STIT(Atm,Agt). Then, ϕ is satisfiable in the class
of temporal Kripke STIT models if and only if it is satisfiable in the class of superadditive
temporal Kripke STIT models.
Proof. (⇒) The left-to-right direction of the equivalence is obvious as the class of temporal
Kripke STIT models is included in the class of superadditive temporal Kripke STIT models.
(⇐)As to the right-to-left direction, I am going to show how to transform a superadditive
temporal Kripke STIT model into a temporal Kripke STIT model without affecting the
satisfiability of a formula. The technique used here is inspired by Vakarelov (1992).
Consider a superadditive temporal Kripke STIT model M = (W,R, {Ri |i ∈ Agt},
RAgt,RG,RH,V) and a worldw in M such that M, w |= ϕ. I am going to define a temporal
Kripke STIT model M ′ = (W ′,R′

, {R′i |i ∈ Agt},R
′
Agt,R
′
G,R
′
H,V
′) that satisfies ϕ.
For every i ∈ Agt, let
1i = {Ri (w)|w ∈ W }
be the partition of W induced by the equivalence class Ri . Elements of 1i are called i’s
choices. Moreover, let
1 = {δ ∈
∏
i∈Agt
1i |
⋂
i∈Agt
δi 6= ∅}
be the set of collective choices. Elements of1 are denoted by δ, δ′, . . .. For every δ ∈ 1, δi
denotes the element in the vector δ corresponding to the agent i . Furthermore, for notational
convenience I write δw to denote the collective choice in 1 that includes the world w. That
is, δw is the collective choice in 1 such that w ∈
⋂
i∈Agt δ
w
i .
For every δ ∈ 1, let
Ŵδ = {RAgt(w)|w ∈
⋂
i∈Agt
δi }
be the set of RAgt-equivalence classes that are included in
⋂
i∈Agt δi .
For every δ ∈ 1, let
kδ : [1, . . . , card(Ŵδ)] −→ Ŵδ
be a bijection associating every integer between 1 and card(Ŵδ) to a unique element of Ŵδ .
In the sequel I write Ŵnδ to indicate the element kδ(n) for every 1 ≤ n ≤ card(Ŵδ).
For every w ∈ W let
TCw = {δ ∈ 1|∃v ∈
⋂
i∈Agt
δi such that v ∈ T (w)}
be the set of collective choices that are temporally related with w, with T (w) = RH(w) ∪
{w} ∪RG(w).
Moreover, let
PCw = {δ ∈ 1|∃v ∈
⋂
i∈Agt
δi such that v ∈ RH(w)}
be the set of collective choices that are in the past of w.
Finally, let
FCw = {δ ∈ 1|∃v ∈
⋂
i∈Agt
δi such that v ∈ RG(w)}
be the set of collective choices that are in the future of w. Note that:
(A1) if v ∈ T (w) then TCw = TCv;
(A2) if v ∈ R(w) then PCw = PCv (because of Proposition 4. in Section 2.2);
(A3) if v ∈ RAgt(w) then δw = δv and PCw = PCv (because of (A2)).
Moreover, let 3w be the set of all total functions f : TCw −→ Zn that satisfy the
following constraint:
• for all δ ∈ TCw and for all −→x ∈ Zn , if f (δ) = −→x then there exists v ∈ T (w) such
that v ∈ Ŵ6xi∈{x1,...,xn }xiδ ,
where Z is the set of integers and −→x = 〈x1, . . . , xn〉. I write fi (δ) to denote the i-element
in the vector f (δ), with 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Because of the Constraint C7, we have that for all w ∈ W and for all −→x ∈ Zn :
(B) if v ∈ T (w) and v ∈ Ŵ6xi∈{x1,...,xn }xiδw then w = v.
Furthermore, because of Proposition 4 in Section 2.2, we have that for all w, v ∈ W
and for all −→x ∈ Zn :
(C) if v ∈ R(w) then there exists u1 ∈ RH(w) such that u1 ∈ Ŵ
6xi∈{x1,...,xn }xi
δ if and
only if there exists u2 ∈ RH(v) such that u2 ∈ Ŵ
6xi∈{x1,...,xn }xi
δ .
From the previous item (C) it follows that for all w, v ∈ W :
(D) if f ∈ 3w and v ∈ R(w) then there exists f ′ ∈ 3v such that, for all δ ∈ PCw,
f ′(δ) = f (δ).
Moreover, from the previous item (A1), for all w, v ∈ W we have that:
(E) if f ∈ 3w and v ∈ T (w) then there exists f ′ ∈ 3v such that, for all δ ∈ TCw,
f ′(δ) = f (δ).
I am now able to define the model M ′ = (W ′,R′

, {R′i |i ∈ Agt},R
′
Agt,R
′
G,R
′
H,V
′):
• W ′ = {w f |w ∈ W and f ∈ 3w};
• for all w f , v f ′ ∈ W ′,
(w f , v f ′) ∈ R′ iff (w, v) ∈ R and f (δ) = f ′(δ) for all δ ∈ PCw;
• for all i ∈ Agt and for all w f , v f ′ ∈ W ′,
(w f , v f ′) ∈ R′i iff δ
w
i = δ
v
i , fi (δw) = f ′i (δv) and f (δ) = f ′(δ) for all δ ∈ PCw;
• for all w f , v f ′ ∈ W ′,
(w f , v f ′) ∈ R′Agt iff δ
w = δv , f (δw) = f ′(δv) and f (δ) = f ′(δ) for all δ ∈ PCw;
• for all w f , v f ′ ∈ W ′,
(w f , v f ′) ∈ R′G iff (w, v) ∈ RG and f (δ) = f ′(δ) for all δ ∈ TCw;
• for all w f , v f ′ ∈ W ′,
(w f , v f ′) ∈ R′H iff (v f ′ , w f ) ∈ R
′
G;
• for all p ∈ Atm, V ′(p) = {w f ∈ W ′|w ∈ V(p)}.
It is a routine task to check that the mapping f : w f 7→ w defines a bounded morphism
from M ′ to M (Blackburn, De Rijke, & Venema, 2001, Definition 2.12). Indeed, it follows
from the definitions of R′

, R′i , R
′
Agt,R
′
G and R
′
H that for all w f , v f ′ ∈ W
′:
• (w f , v f ′) ∈ R′i implies (w, v) ∈ Ri ;
• (w f , v f ′) ∈ R′Agt implies (w, v) ∈ RAgt ;
• (w f , v f ′) ∈ R′ implies (w, v) ∈ R;
• (w f , v f ′) ∈ R′G implies (w, v) ∈ RG;
• (w f , v f ′) ∈ R′H implies (w, v) ∈ RH.
For instance, suppose that (w f , v f ′) ∈ R′i . By definition of R
′
i the latter implies that
δwi = δ
v
i and w ∈ δwi and v ∈ δvi . The latter implies that (w, v) ∈ Ri .
Now, suppose that (w f , v f ′) ∈ R′Agt . This implies that δ
w = δv and f (δw) = f ′(δv). By
the previous observation (B), it follows thatw, v ∈ Ŵ f1(δw)+...+ fn(δw)δw . Thus, (w, v) ∈ RAgt .
The other way around we have that for all w f ∈ W ′:
• if ( f (w f ), v) ∈ R then there is v f ′ such that (w f , v f ′) ∈ R′;
• if ( f (w f ), v) ∈ Ri then there is v f ′ such that (w f , v f ′) ∈ R′i ;
• if ( f (w f ), v) ∈ RAgt then there is v f ′ such that (w f , v f ′) ∈ R′Agt ;
• if ( f (w f ), v) ∈ RG then there is v f ′ such that (w f , v f ′) ∈ R′G;
• if ( f (w f ), v) ∈ RH then there is v f ′ such that (w f , v f ′) ∈ R′H.
Let me prove the previous items. The first item is trivial and I do not prove it here.
Suppose thatw f ∈ W ′ and ( f (w f ), v) ∈ Ri . This implies that (w, v) ∈ Ri . Therefore,
Ri (w) = Ri (v) as Ri is an equivalence relation. Hence, δvi = δ
w
i . It follows that
(w f , v f ′) ∈ R′i where the function f ′ is defined as follows: (i) f ′i (δv) = fi (δw) and all
f ′j (δv) with j 6= i are such that v ∈ Ŵ
f ′1(δv)+...+ f ′n(δv)
δv ; (ii) for all δ ∈ PCw, f ′(δ) = f (δ);
(iii) for all δ ∈ FCv , f ′(δ) is such that there exists u ∈ RG(v) with u ∈ Ŵ f
′
1(δ)+...+ f ′n(δ)
δ .
This function f ′ is guaranteed to exist because of the observation (D) above and the fact
that Ri ⊆ R.
Suppose that w f ∈ W ′ and ( f (w f ), v) ∈ RAgt . This implies that (w, v) ∈ RAgt .
Therefore, RAgt(w) = RAgt(v) as RAgt is an equivalence relation. Hence, δv = δw. It
follows that (w f , v f ′) ∈ R′Agt where the function f ′ is defined as follows: (i) f ′(δv) =
f (δw); (ii) for all δ ∈ PCw, f ′(δ) = f (δ); (iii) for all δ ∈ FCv , f ′(δ) is such that there
exists u ∈ RG(v) with u ∈ Ŵ
f ′1(δ)+...+ f ′n(δ)
δ . This function f ′ is guaranteed to exist because
of the observation (D) above and the fact that RAgt ⊆ R.
Suppose that w f ∈ W ′ and ( f (w f ), v) ∈ RG. This implies that (w, v) ∈ RG.
It follows that (w f , v f ′) ∈ R′G where the function f ′ is such that, for all δ ∈ TCw,f ′(δ) = f (δ). This function f ′ is guaranteed to exist because of the observation (E) above.
Thus, (w f , v f ′) ∈ R′G.
Finally, suppose that w f ∈ W ′ and ( f (w f ), v) ∈ RH. This implies that (w, v) ∈ RH
which is equivalent to (v,w) ∈ RG. It follows that (v f ′ , w f ) ∈ R′G where the function f ′
is such that, for all δ ∈ TCv , f (δ) = f ′(δ). This function f ′ is guaranteed to exist because
of the observation (E) above. Thus, (w f , v f ′) ∈ R′H.
As f is a bounded morphism it holds that M, w |= ϕ if and only if M ′, w f |= ϕ. Thus,
M ′, w f |= ϕ for all w f ∈ W ′.
In order to terminate the proof we also need to be sure that M ′ is a temporal Kripke
STIT model in the sense of Definition 1. It is a routine task to show that R′i , R
′
Agt and R
′

are equivalence relations, that the model transformation preserves transitivity and seriality
for the relation R′G, and that the model M
′ satisfies the Constraints C1, C2, C4, C5 and C7.
Let me prove that it also satisfies Constraints C3 and C6.
v f ′ ∈
⋂
i∈Agt R
′
i (w f ) if and only if (i) δwi = δvi and fi (δw) = f ′i (δv) for all i ∈ Agt;
and (ii) f (δ) = f ′(δ) for all δ ∈ PCw. The latter is equivalent to δw = δv , f (δw) = f ′(δv)
and f (δ) = f ′(δ) for all δ ∈ PCw, which in turn is equivalent to v f ′ ∈ R′Agt(w f ). This
proves that the model M ′ satisfies the Constraint C3.
Now suppose that v f ′ ∈ R′G(w f ) and u f ′′ ∈ R
′

(v f ′). It follows that: (i) f (δ) = f ′(δ)
for all δ ∈ TCw; and (ii) f ′(δ) = f ′′(δ) for all δ ∈ PCv . Moreover, since the model M
satisfies the Constraint C6, there exists z ∈ W such that z ∈ RAgt(w) and u ∈ RG(z).
Let f ′′′ ∈ 3z be the function that for all δ ∈ TCz , f ′′(δ) = f ′′′(δ). It follows that
u f ′′ ∈ R′G(z f ′′′). I am going to prove that z f ′′′ ∈ R
′
Agt(w f ). From the previous conditions
(i) and (ii) it follows that f (δ) = f ′′(δ) for all δ ∈ TCw ∩ PCv . Since v ∈ RG(w),
TCw ∩PCv = PCv . Hence, f (δ) = f ′′(δ) for all δ ∈ PCv . Furthermore, f (δ) = f ′′(δ) for
all δ ∈ PCw∪{δw}, because v ∈ RG(w). From the latter and the fact that f ′′(δw) = f ′′′(δz)
for all δ ∈ TCz , it follows that f (δw) = f ′′′(δz) for all δ ∈ TCz ∩ (PCw ∪ {δw}). Since z ∈
RAgt(w), by the previous observation (A3), it follows that δw = δz and f (δw) = f ′′′(δz)
for all δ ∈ PCw ∪ {δw}. Hence, f (δw) = f ′′′(δz) and f (δ) = f ′′′(δ) for all δ ∈ PCw.
Thus, z f ′′′ ∈ R′G(w f ′). This proves that the model M
′ satisfies the Constraint C6. 
The following lemma provides an axiomatisation result for the class of superadditive
temporal Kripke STIT models.
Lemma 10. The set of T-STIT formulas that are valid in the class of superadditive
temporal Kripke STIT models is completely axiomatised by the principles given in Figure 2.
Proof. In order to prove Lemma 10, I use a technique similar to the one used by Gabbay,
Hodkinson and Reynolds (1994) for proving completeness of linear temporal logic and of
logic of historical necessity by means of a slightly different variant of the irreflexivity rule
(IRR).
Let me start with the following standard definition of canonical model for T-STIT.
Definition 11 (Canonical model for T-STIT). The canonical model Mc for T-STIT is the
tuple Mc = (W c,Rc

, {Rci |i ∈ Agt},R
c
Agt,R
c
G,R
c
H,V
c) where:
• W c is the set of all maximal consistent sets of T-STIT formulas (MCSs);
• Rc

,Rci ,R
c
Agt,R
c
G and R
c
H are respectively the canonical relations for , [i],
[Agt], G and H, that is:
− for all Ŵ,1 ∈ W c, (Ŵ,1) ∈ Rc

iff for all formulas ψ , ψ ∈ 1 implies
♦ψ ∈ Ŵ;
− for all Ŵ,1 ∈ W c and for all i ∈ Agt, (Ŵ,1) ∈ Rci iff for all formulas ψ ,
ψ ∈ 1 implies 〈i〉ψ ∈ Ŵ;
− for all Ŵ,1 ∈ W c, (Ŵ,1) ∈ RcAgt iff for all formulas ψ , ψ ∈ 1 implies
〈Agt〉ψ ∈ Ŵ;
− for all Ŵ,1 ∈ W c, (Ŵ,1) ∈ RcG iff for all formulas ψ , ψ ∈ 1 implies
Fψ ∈ Ŵ;
− for all Ŵ,1 ∈ W c, (Ŵ,1) ∈ RcH iff for all formulas ψ , ψ ∈ 1 implies
Pψ ∈ Ŵ;
• Vc is the valuation defined by Vc(p) = {Ŵ ∈ W c|p ∈ Ŵ} for all p ∈ Atm.
Furthermore, let me introduce the notion of ‘diamond’-saturation for maximal consistent
sets of T-STIT formulas.
Definition 12 (Diamond saturated set of MCSs). Given a set X of maximal consistent
sets of T-STIT formulas, I say that X is a diamond saturated set of MCSs if and only if for
each Ŵ ∈ X the following five conditions are satisfied:
• for each formula ♦ϕ ∈ Ŵ there is 1 ∈ X such that (Ŵ,1) ∈ Rc

and ϕ ∈ 1;
• for each formula 〈i〉ϕ ∈ Ŵ there is 1 ∈ X such that (Ŵ,1) ∈ Rci and ϕ ∈ 1;
• for each formula 〈Agt〉ϕ ∈ Ŵ there is 1 ∈ X such that (Ŵ,1) ∈ RcAgt and ϕ ∈ 1;
• for each formula Fϕ ∈ Ŵ there is 1 ∈ X such that (Ŵ,1) ∈ RcG and ϕ ∈ 1;
• for each formula Pϕ ∈ Ŵ there is 1 ∈ X such that (Ŵ,1) ∈ RcH and ϕ ∈ 1.
The following truth lemma is provable in the standard way by induction on ϕ (see
Blackburn et al., 2001, Lemma 4.70).
Lemma 13 (Truth Lemma). Let X be a diamond saturated set of MCSs. Then for any
Ŵ ∈ X and for any formula ϕ, Mc|X , Ŵ |= ϕ if and only if ϕ ∈ Ŵ, where Mc|X is the
submodel of the canonical model Mc induced by X.
The next step in the proof consists in defining the notion of IRR theory.
For every atom p, let
name(p) def= ¬p ∧(Gp ∧ Hp).
The formula name(p) acts as a sort of ‘name’ for a given world that ensures irreflexivity
of the canonical relation RcG for the future tense operator G.
Furthermore, let
2 = {1(ψ1 ∧ 2(ψ2 ∧ . . . ∧ nψn) . . .) :
1, . . . ,n ∈ {♦, 〈1〉, . . . , 〈n〉, 〈Agt〉,F,P} and ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ LT-STIT(Atm,Agt)}.
Finally, for every ϕ = 1(ψ1 ∧ 2(ψ2 ∧ . . . ∧ nψn) . . .) ∈ 2 and for every atom p,
let
ϕ(p) def= 1(ψ1 ∧ 2(ψ2 ∧ . . . ∧ n(ψn ∧ name(p))) . . .).
A formula of the form ϕ(p) is also used as a ‘name’ for a given world. In particular,
formulas of the form ϕ(p) provide ‘names’ for worlds that are reachable by any zig-zagging
sequence of ♦s, 〈i〉s, 〈Agt〉s, Fs and Ps.
Definition 14 (IRR theory). An IRR theory is a maximal consistent set of T-STIT formulas
Ŵ such that:
• for some p, name(p) ∈ Ŵ;
• if ϕ ∈ Ŵ ∩2 then, for some atom p, ϕ(p) ∈ Ŵ.
The set of all IRR theories is denoted by IrrTh.
The following lemma highlights that every consistent T-STIT formula is included in at
least one IRR theory. The rule of inference (IRR) becomes crucial at this point of the proof.
Lemma 15. Let ϕ be a consistent T-STIT formula. Then, there exists an IRR theory Ŵ
such that ϕ ∈ Ŵ.
(Sketch). The lemma is proved analogously to Lemma 6.2.4 in Gabbay et al. (1994,
Chapter 6). Since the set Atm of propositional atoms is infinite, there exists an infinite
number of atomic formulas p not occurring in ϕ. Therefore, thanks to the (IRR) rule, it is
straightforward to build step-by-step an IRR theory Ŵ containing ϕ. 
The following lemma highlights that the set of all IRR theories satisfies the condition
of ‘diamond’-saturation defined above (Definition 12).
Lemma 16 (Existence Lemma).
Let Ŵ be an IRR theory. Then:
• if ♦ϕ ∈ Ŵ, then there is an IRR theory 1 such that (Ŵ,1) ∈ Rc

and ϕ ∈ 1;
• if 〈i〉ϕ ∈ Ŵ, then there is an IRR theory 1 such that (Ŵ,1) ∈ Rci and ϕ ∈ 1;
• if 〈Agt〉ϕ ∈ Ŵ, then there is an IRR theory 1 such that (Ŵ,1) ∈ RcAgt and ϕ ∈ 1;
• if Fϕ ∈ Ŵ, then there is an IRR theory 1 such that (Ŵ,1) ∈ RcG and ϕ ∈ 1;
• if Pϕ ∈ Ŵ, then there is an IRR theory 1 such that (Ŵ,1) ∈ RcH and ϕ ∈ 1.
Proof. I only prove the first item. The other items can be proved analogously.
Suppose ♦ϕ ∈ Ŵ. Since Ŵ is an IRR theory, it follows that ♦(ϕ ∧ name(p)) ∈ Ŵ
for some atom p. Let 10 = {ϕ ∧ name(p)} ∪ {ψ |ψ ∈ Ŵ}. I am going to show that
10 is consistent by reductio ad absurdum. Suppose 10 is not consistent. Then, for some
ψ1, . . . , ψk ∈ {ψ |ψ ∈ Ŵ}, we have:
⊢ (ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψk)→ ¬(ϕ ∧ name(p)),
hence
⊢ (ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψk)→ ¬(ϕ ∧ name(p)),
and hence¬(ϕ∧name(p)) ∈ Ŵ (because(ψ1∧. . .∧ψk) ∈ Ŵ). But this is in contradiction
with ♦(ϕ ∧ name(p)) ∈ Ŵ.
Now, I turn to define an increasing sequence of consistent extensions (1n)n≥0 such that
1n ⊆ 1n+1 for all n.
Assume 1n ⊆ 1n+1 has been defined and is consistent. Then, either 1n ∪ {χn} is
consistent or 1n ∪ {¬χn} is consistent.
Case 1: 1n ∪ {¬χn} consistent. Take 1n+1 = 1n ∪ {¬χn}.
Case 2a: 1n ∪ {¬χn} not consistent, 1n ∪ {χn} consistent and χn 6∈ 2. Take 1n+1 =
1n ∪ {χn}.
Case 2b: 1n ∪ {¬χn} not consistent, 1n ∪ {χn} consistent and χn ∈ 2. We have that:
♦((ϕ ∧ name(p)) ∧
∧
ψ∈1n\10
ψ ∧ χn) ∈ Ŵ.
For, otherwise,
(((ϕ ∧ name(p)) ∧
∧
ψ∈1n\10
ψ)→ ¬χn) ∈ Ŵ
and hence, by definition of 10, ((ϕ ∧ name(p)) ∧
∧
ψ∈1n\10
ψ)→ ¬χn ∈ 1n .
Hence, since ((ϕ ∧ name(p)) ∧
∧
ψ∈1n\10
ψ) ∈ 1n , ¬χn ∈ 1n .
This is in contradiction with the fact that 1n ∪ {χn} is consistent.
Thus, since Ŵ is an IRR theory, for some atom q , we have
♦((ϕ ∧ name(p)) ∧
∧
ψ∈1n\10
ψ ∧ χn(q)) ∈ Ŵ.
It follows that1n ∪{χn}∪{χn(q)} is consistent. For, otherwise, for someψ1, . . . , ψk ∈
{ψ |ψ ∈ Ŵ}, we have:
⊢ (ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψk)→ ¬((ϕ ∧ name(p)) ∧
∧
ψ∈1n\10
ψ ∧ χn(q)),
hence
⊢ (ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψk)→ ¬((ϕ ∧ name(p)) ∧
∧
ψ∈1n\10
ψ ∧ χn(q)),
and hence¬((ϕ∧name(p))∧
∧
ψ∈1n\10
ψ∧χn(q)) ∈ Ŵ (because(ψ1∧. . .∧ψk) ∈ Ŵ).
But this is in contradiction with ♦((ϕ ∧ name(p)) ∧
∧
ψ∈1n\10
ψ ∧ χn(q)) ∈ Ŵ.
Let 1n+1 = 1n ∪ {χn} ∪ {χn(q)}.
Thus, the sequence (1n)n≥0 is defined and, clearly, 1 =
⋃
n≥0 1n is the desired IRR
theory such that (Ŵ,1) ∈ Rc

and ϕ ∈ 1. 
The last part of the proof consists in proving that the submodel of the canonical model
for T-STIT including all IRR theories, i.e., the model Mc|IrrTh, is indeed a superadditive
temporal Kripke STIT model. The following two propositions ensure that Mc|IrrTh satisfies
the Constraints C2 and C6.
Proposition 17. LetŴ1, . . . , Ŵn be IRR theories such that for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, (Ŵi , Ŵ j ) ∈
Rc

. Then, there exists an IRR theory 1 such that (Ŵ1,1) ∈ Rc1, . . . , (Ŵn,1) ∈ R
c
n .
Proof. In order to simplify the exposition, let us assume that n = 2. The general case for
any arbitrary n can be proved analogously.
Suppose Ŵ1 and Ŵ2 are IRR theories such that for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 2, (Ŵi , Ŵ j ) ∈ Rc. I am
going to show that there exists an IRR theory1 such that (Ŵ1,1) ∈ Rc1 and (Ŵ2,1) ∈ R
c
2.
Since Ŵ1 and Ŵ2 are IRR theories, there exists name(p1) ∈ Ŵ1 and name(p2) ∈ Ŵ2 for
some atoms p1, p2.
Let 10 = {name(p1)} ∪ {name(p2)} ∪ {ψ |[1]ψ ∈ Ŵ1} ∪ {ψ |[2]ψ ∈ Ŵ2}. I am going to
show that 10 is consistent by reductio ad absurdum.
Suppose 10 is not consistent. Then, for some ψ1, . . . , ψk ∈ 10, we have:
⊢ (ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψk)→⊥.
Let Y denote the set {ψ1, . . . , ψk}. Moreover, let Y1 = {ψ ∈ Y |[1]ψ ∈ Ŵ1 or
ψ = name(p1)} and Y2 = {ψ ∈ Y |[2]ψ ∈ Ŵ2 or ψ = name(p2)}. Clearly, Y = Y1 ∪ Y2
and:
(A) [1]∧ψ∈Y1 ψ ∈ Ŵ1.
The previous item (A) follows from these two facts: (i) for every ψ ∈ Y1 such that
ψ 6= name(p1), [1]ψ ∈ Ŵ1 (becauseψ is of the form [1]χ and [1]χ → [1][1]χ is a T-STIT
theorem); and (ii) [1]name(p1) ∈ Ŵ1 (because name(p1) → [1]name(p1) is a T-STIT
theorem). Likewise, we have:
(B) [2]∧ψ∈Y2 ψ ∈ Ŵ2.
From the definition of the accessibility relation Rc

and the fact that (Ŵ1, Ŵ2) ∈ Rc,
it follows that ♦[2]
∧
ψ∈Y2 ψ ∈ Ŵ1. Moreover, by the T-STIT theorem ⊢ [1]ψ → ♦[1]ψ ,
we have ♦[1]
∧
ψ∈Y1 ψ ∈ Ŵ1. By the Axiom (AIA), it follows that ♦([1]
∧
ψ∈Y1 ψ ∧
[2]
∧
ψ∈Y2 ψ) ∈ Ŵ1. Hence, by Lemma 16, there is an IRR theory1 such that (Ŵ1,1) ∈ R
c

and ([1]
∧
ψ∈Y1 ψ∧[2]
∧
ψ∈Y2 ψ) ∈ 1. Hence, byAxiom T for [i], there is an IRR theory1
such that (Ŵ1,1) ∈ Rc and (
∧
ψ∈Y1 ψ ∧
∧
ψ∈Y2 ψ) ∈ 1. The latter implies that
∧
ψ∈Y ψ
is consistent. Hence, 6⊢ (ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψk)→⊥.
The rest of the proof proceeds in the same way as the proof of Lemma 16. Specifically, I
turn to define an increasing sequence of consistent extensions (1n)n≥0 such that1n ⊆ 1n+1
for all n.
Assume 1n ⊆ 1n+1 has been defined and is consistent. Then, either 1n ∪ {χn} is
consistent or 1n ∪ {¬χn} is consistent.
Case 1: 1n ∪ {¬χn} consistent. Take 1n+1 = 1n ∪ {¬χn}.
Case 2a: 1n ∪ {¬χn} not consistent, 1n ∪ {χn} consistent and χn 6∈ 2. Take 1n+1 =
1n ∪ {χn}.
Case 2b: 1n ∪ {¬χn} not consistent, 1n ∪ {χn} consistent and χn ∈ 2. We have that:
〈1〉(name(p1) ∧
∧
ψ∈1n\10
ψ ∧ χn) ∈ Ŵ1.
For, otherwise,
[1]((name(p1) ∧
∧
ψ∈1n\10
ψ)→ ¬χn) ∈ Ŵ1
and hence, by definition of 10, (name(p1) ∧
∧
ψ∈1n\10
ψ) → ¬χn ∈ 1n . Hence, since
(name(p1) ∧
∧
ψ∈1n\10
ψ) ∈ 1n , ¬χn ∈ 1n . This is in contradiction with the fact that
1n ∪ {χn} is consistent.
Therefore, for some atom q ,
〈1〉(name(p1) ∧
∧
ψ∈1n\10
ψ ∧ χn(q)) ∈ Ŵ1.
It follows that 1n ∪ {χn} ∪ {χn(q)} is consistent. For, otherwise, for some
ψ1, . . . , ψk ∈ {ψ |[1]ψ ∈ Ŵ1}, we have:
⊢ (ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψk)→ ¬(name(p1) ∧
∧
ψ∈1n\10
ψ ∧ χn(q)),
hence
⊢ [1](ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψk)→ [1]¬(name(p) ∧
∧
ψ∈1n\10
ψ ∧ χn(q)),
and hence [1]¬(name(p1)∧
∧
ψ∈1n\10
ψ∧χn(q)) ∈ Ŵ1 (because [1](ψ1∧. . .∧ψk) ∈ Ŵ1).
But this is in contradiction with 〈1〉(name(p1) ∧
∧
ψ∈1n\10
ψ ∧ χn(q)) ∈ Ŵ1.
Let 1n+1 = 1n ∪ {χn} ∪ {χn(q)}.
Thus, the sequence (1n)n≥0 is defined and, clearly, 1 =
⋃
n≥0 1n is the desired IRR
theory such that (Ŵ1,1) ∈ Rc1 and (Ŵ2,1) ∈ R
c
2. 
Proposition 18. Let 1,Ŵ and Ŵ′ be IRR theories such that (1, Ŵ) ∈ RcG and (Ŵ, Ŵ
′) ∈
Rc

. Then, there exists an IRR theory 1′ such that (1,1′) ∈ RcAgt and (1′, Ŵ′) ∈ R
c
G.
Proof. Suppose 1,Ŵ and Ŵ′ are IRR theories such that (1, Ŵ) ∈ RcG and (Ŵ, Ŵ′) ∈ Rc.
It follows that name(p) ∈ 1 for some atom p. Hence, by definition of RcH, Pname(p) ∈ Ŵ.
By definition of Rc

, it follows that ♦Pname(p) ∈ Ŵ′. We have the following T-STIT
theorem:
⊢ ♦Pϕ → P〈Agt〉ϕ. (1)
The following is the Hilbert-style proof:
1. ⊢ ♦H[Agt]ϕ → HF♦H[Agt]ϕ.
By Axiom(ConvH,G).
2. ⊢ HF♦H[Agt]ϕ → H〈Agt〉FH[Agt]ϕ.
By Axiom(NCUH),Axiom K and necessitation for H.
3. ⊢ H〈Agt〉FH[Agt]ϕ → H〈Agt〉[Agt]ϕ.
By Axiom(ConvH,G),Axiom K and necessitation for H and agt.
4. ⊢ H〈Agt〉[Agt]ϕ → Hϕ.
By T-STIT theorem ⊢ 〈Agt〉[Agt]ϕ → ϕ,Axiom K and necessitation for H.
5. ⊢ Pϕ → P〈Agt〉ϕ.
From 1–4.
6. ⊢ ♦Pϕ → ♦P〈Agt〉ϕ.
By 5, Axiom K and necessitation for.
7. ⊢ ♦P〈Agt〉ϕ → P〈Agt〉ϕ.
By T-STIT theorem ⊢ ♦ϕ → ϕ.
8. ⊢ P〈Agt〉ϕ → P〈Agt〉ϕ.
By Axiom T for .
9. ⊢ ♦Pϕ → P〈Agt〉ϕ.
From 6–8.
Thus, by the previous T-STIT theorem 1, P〈Agt〉name(p) ∈ Ŵ′. Hence, by
Lemma 16, there exists an IRR theory1′ such that 〈Agt〉name(p) ∈ 1′ and (1′, Ŵ′) ∈ RcG.
By the T-STIT theorem ⊢ 〈Agt〉name(p) → name(p), the latter implies that there exists
an IRR theory 1′ such that name(p) ∈ 1′ and (1′, Ŵ′) ∈ RcG. I am going to show that
(1,1′) ∈ RcAgt .
Assume [Agt]ψ ∈ 1. We have the following T-STIT theorem:
⊢ (name(p) ∧ [Agt]ψ)→ GH(name(p)→ ψ). (2)
The following is the Hilbert-style proof:
1. ⊢ p → ¬name(p).
By definition of name(p) and Axiom T for .
2. ⊢ name(p)→ [Agt](Gp ∧ Hp).
By definition of name(p), Axiom (→ i) and Axiom (i → Agt).
3. ⊢ [Agt](Gp ∧ Hp)→ ([Agt]Gp ∧ [Agt]Hp).
By Axiom K for [Agt].
4. ⊢ ([Agt]Gp ∧ [Agt]Hp)→ ([Agt]G¬name(p) ∧ [Agt]H¬name(p)).
By 1, Axiom K and necessitation for [Agt], G and H.
5. ⊢ (name(p) ∧ [Agt]ψ)→ ([Agt]ψ ∧ [Agt]G¬name(p) ∧ [Agt]H¬name(p)).
From 2–4.
6. ⊢ ([Agt]ψ ∧ [Agt]G¬name(p) ∧ [Agt]H¬name(p))→
([Agt](¬name(p) ∨ ψ) ∧ [Agt]G(¬name(p) ∨ ψ) ∧ [Agt]H(¬name(p) ∨ ψ)).
By Axiom K and necessitation for [Agt], G and H.
7. ⊢ ([Agt](¬name(p) ∨ ψ) ∧ [Agt]G(¬name(p) ∨ ψ) ∧ [Agt]H(¬name(p) ∨ ψ))→
[Agt]((¬name(p) ∨ ψ) ∧G(¬name(p) ∨ ψ) ∧ H(¬name(p) ∨ ψ)).
By Axiom K for [Agt].
8. ⊢ [Agt]((¬name(p) ∨ ψ) ∧G(¬name(p) ∨ ψ) ∧ H(¬name(p) ∨ ψ))→
[Agt]GH(¬name(p) ∨ ψ).
By Axiom (ConnectedH), Axiom K and necessitation for [Agt].
9. ⊢ [Agt]GH(¬name(p) ∨ ψ)→ GH(¬name(p) ∨ ψ).
By Axiom (NCUH).
10. ⊢ GH(¬name(p) ∨ ψ)→ GH(name(p)→ ψ).
11. ⊢ (name(p) ∧ [Agt]ψ)→ GH(name(p)→ ψ).
From 5–10.
Since [Agt]ψ ∈ 1 and name(p) ∈ 1, by the previous T-STIT theorem 2, we have
GH(name(p) → ψ) ∈ 1. Thus, by definition of RcG and the fact that (1, Ŵ) ∈
RcG, H(name(p) → ψ) ∈ Ŵ. By definition of R
c

and the fact that (Ŵ, Ŵ′) ∈ Rc

,
H(name(p) → ψ) ∈ Ŵ′. Finally, by definition of RcH and the fact that (Ŵ
′,1′) ∈ RcH,
name(p)→ ψ ∈ 1′. Since name(p) ∈ 1′, it follows that ψ ∈ 1′. 
Lemma 19. Mc|IrrTh is a superadditive temporal Kripke STIT model.
Proof. First of all, it is a routine task to prove that: (i) the canonical relations Rc

,Rci and
RcAgt are equivalence relations; (ii) the canonical relation RcG is transitive; (iii) the canonical
relation RcH is the inverse of the canonical relation R
c
G; and (iv) the canonical model Mc
satisfies the Constraints C1, C3∗, C4 and C5.
Indeed, Axioms T, 4 and B for , [i] and for [Agt] are canonical for reflexivity,
transitivity and symmetry thereby ensuring that the canonical relations Rc

,Rci and R
c
Agt
are equivalence relations. Axiom 4 for G is canonical for transitivity, thereby ensuring that
the canonical relation RcG is transitive. Axiom (ConvG,H) is canonical for the condition
RH ⊆ R
−1
G , while Axiom (ConvH,G) is canonical for the condition RG ⊆ R−1H , thereby
ensuring that RcH is the inverse of the canonical relation R
c
G.
Finally, Axioms (→ i), (i → Agt), (ConnectedG) and (ConnectedH) are canonical
respectively for the Constraints C1, C3∗, C4 and C5, thereby ensuring that the canonical
model Mc satisfies them.
Since Mc|IrrTh is a submodel of the canonical model Mc, Mc|IrrTh inherits from Mc all
previous universal properties. Specifically, we have that: (i) the relationsRc

|IrrTh,R
c
i |IrrTh
and RcAgt |IrrTh are equivalence relations; (ii) the relation RcG|IrrTh is transitive; (iii) the
relation RcH|IrrTh is the inverse of the relation R
c
G|IrrTh; and (iv) the model Mc|IrrTh
satisfies the Constraints C1, C3∗, C4 and C5.
By Propositions 17 and 18, Mc|IrrTh also satisfies Constraints C2 and C6.
It remains to prove that the relation RcG|IrrTh is serial and that the model M
c|IrrTh
satisfies the Constraint C7.
Since G⊤ is a T-STIT theorem, every IRR theory contains it. Thus, by Lemma 16, for
every IRR theory Ŵ there exists an IRR theory 1 such that (Ŵ,1) ∈ RcG. This guarantees
that the relation RcG|IrrTh is serial.
Now, suppose that (Ŵ,1) ∈ Rc

|IrrTh. Since 1 is an IRR theory, name(p) ∈ 1 for
some atom p. Hence, p ∈ 1. Moreover, G¬p ∈ 1. By definition of Rc

, it follows that
♦G¬p ∈ Ŵ. Thus, by the T-STIT theorem ⊢ ♦ϕ → ϕ, G¬p ∈ Ŵ. By Axiom T for
, it follows that G¬p ∈ Ŵ. The latter implies that Fp 6∈ Ŵ. Since p ∈ 1, this guarantees
that (Ŵ,1) 6∈ RcG|IrrTh. Thus, M
c|IrrTh satisfies the Constraint C7. 
Lemma 10 follows from Lemma 13, Lemma 15, Lemma 16 and Lemma 19. Indeed,
suppose that ϕ is a T-STIT consistent formula. Then, by Lemma 15, there exists an IRR
theory Ŵ in the model Mc|IrrTh such that ϕ ∈ Ŵ. By Lemma 19, model Mc|IrrTh is a
superadditive temporal Kripke STIT model. Moreover, by Lemma 16, the set of all IRR
theories is diamond saturated. Thus, by Lemma 13, Mc|IrrTh, Ŵ |= ϕ. It follows that ϕ is
T-STIT satisfiable. 
Theorem 7 follows from Lemma 9 and Lemma 10.
3. Application to normative reasoning
Many normative concepts such as achievement obligation, obligation with deadline and
social commitment have an intrinsic agentive and temporal nature – that is to say, they
cannot be properly understood without considering their relationships with the concepts
of action and time. The aim of this section is to show that the logic T-STIT is expressive
enough to capture some of these relationships. I focus on the notion of social commitment
and on its relationship with the notion of achievement obligation, postponing the logical
analysis of obligations with deadline in STIT to future work.
According to Singh (1999) and Castelfranchi (1995), a social commitment is a kind of
normative relationship between a debtor and a creditor. The contexts in which commitments
are undertaken and established are often institutional contexts. For instance, after signing a
contract in the presence of a public notary, a person becomes committed in front of the State
to carry out her part of the contract. In this article, I only consider pragmatic commitments
and I leave aside propositional commitments (also called dialectical commitments). Prag-
matic commitments are about what is to be done whereas propositional commitments are
about what is true. Pragmatic commitments concern promises from a debtor to a creditor to
perform a given action, while propositional commitments are about positions taken during
a dialogue. For example, if i tells to j : ‘I will lend you my car for the weekend!’ then, he
makes a pragmatic commitment to j . On the contrary, if i tells to j : ‘Tomorrow, will be
sunny. I am sure!’ then, he makes a propositional commitment to j .
In order to be able to define social commitment, let us suppose that the set of propositional
atoms Atm contains special atoms of the form vi, j , one for every i, j ∈ Agt such that i 6= j .
These are similar to the special atoms for violation that are used in the Anderson’s reduction
of deontic logic to alethic logic (Anderson, 1958; Lindahl, 1994). In the semantics, the
special atom vi, j is used to identify those worlds in which agent i does not fulfil her
commitments to agent j . The atom vi, j has to be read ‘in the actual world, agent i does not
fulfil her commitment to agent j’. Special atoms vi, j can be combined with the tense operator
G∗ in order to identify those histories in which agent i will never fulfil her commitment to
agent j . In particular, formula G∗vi, j has to be read ‘in the actual history, agent i will never
fulfil her commitment to agent j’or also ‘in the actual history, agent j is wronged by agent i’.
I say that agent i is committed to agent j to ensure ϕ (denoted by Ci : jϕ) if and only if:
(i) all historic alternatives in which i will never see to it that ϕ, are histories in which agent
i will never fulfil her commitment to agent j ; and (ii) i does not see to it that ϕ. In other
words, i will not fulfil her commitment to j unless i will see to it that ϕ at some point in
the future. For every i, j ∈ Agt, I define:
Ci : jϕ
def
= (¬F∗[i]ϕ → G∗vi, j ) ∧ ¬[i]ϕ.
Let me make three observations about the preceding definition of commitment. First of
all, it is worth noting that it is related to the notion of achievement obligation (Broersen
et al., 2003; Governatori & Rotolo, 2010). The idea is that an agent has an achievement
obligation to bring aboutϕ if and only if she has the obligation to bring aboutϕ at some point
in the future.4 Thus, commitment can be seen as a specific kind of achievement obligation.
Specifically, it can be conceived as a directed achievement obligation from a bearer to a
counterparty (for some analysis of the notion of directed obligation in deontic logic, see,
e.g., Dignum, 1999; Herrestad & Krogh, 1995; Kanger & Kanger, 1966; Lindahl, 1994;
Makinson, 1986).5 That is to say, agent i is committed to agent j to bring about ϕ if and
only if i has the obligation towards j to bring about ϕ at some point in the future. Secondly,
the component ¬[i]ϕ expresses that i is committed to j to ensure ϕ only if i has not yet
fulfilled her commitment to j by bringing about ϕ. In this sense, the formula [i]ϕ can be
conceived as the discharge condition for commitment. Suppose agent i is committed to
agent j to ensure ϕ. Then, if i sees to it that ϕ, then her commitment to j is discharged and
is no longer active. Finally, according to the preceding definition, the fact that i brought
about ϕ in the past (before being committed to j) is irrelevant. Indeed, the general intuition
is that being committed now to do some action means being obliged to do the action either
in the present or at some point in the strict future. Therefore, while the fact of performing
the action in the present is a sufficient condition for discharging an actual commitment, the
fact of having performed the action in the past is not.
The following example illustrates the preceding definition of commitment in a concrete
scenario.
Example 20. Agent 2 is the programme chair of a given conference. Agent 2 asks agent 1,
a member of the programme committee, to review some articles submitted for the conference.
Agent 1 accepts agent 2’s request by sending a confirmation e-mail (we suppose that the
communication between 1 and 2 is made through the Easychair system). Consequently,
according to the programme committee of the conference, agent 1 is committed to 2 to
review the articles: C1:2 review. This means that (i) all historic alternatives in which 1 will
never review the articles are histories in which 2 is wronged by 1; and (ii) 1 has not yet
fulfilled her commitment to 2 by reviewing the articles:
(¬F∗[1]review → G∗v1,2) ∧ ¬[1]review.
Now, let us consider some logical properties of the commitment operator Ci : j .According
to the following T-STIT theorem 3, if i is committed to j to ensure ϕ∧ψ then i is committed
to j to ensure ϕ and to ensure ψ . For every i, j ∈ Agt we have:
⊢T-STIT Ci : j (ϕ ∧ ψ)→ (Ci : jϕ ∧ Ci : jψ). (3)
Note that the converse of T-STIT theorem 3 is not valid. Indeed, the fact that i is
committed to j to ensure ϕ and to ensureψ (i.e., Ci : jϕ∧Ci : jψ) does not necessarily imply
that i is committed to j to ensure that ϕ and ψ are true at the same point in the future (i.e.,
Ci : j (ϕ ∧ ψ)). For example, i may be committed to j to lend her a car and to lend her a
motorbike at different points in the future without being committed to lending her a car and
a motorbike at the same point in the future.
The following theorem 4 highlights that an agent cannot be committed to bring about
tautologies:
⊢T-STIT ¬Ci : j⊤. (4)
Indeed, since [i]⊤ is a T-STIT theorem, agent i’s commitment to bring about ⊤ is
always discharged.
The following T-STIT theorem 5 is a weakening principle for commitment. A similar
property of commitment has been isolated by Singh (2008). For every i, j ∈ Agt we have:
⊢T-STIT (Ci : j (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ [i]ϕ)→ Ci : jψ. (5)
This means that if agent i is committed to agent j to ensure ϕ ∧ ψ and agent i sees to
it that ϕ, then i is committed to j to ensure ψ . So, if an agent is committed to ensuring two
states of affairs ϕ and ψ and her commitment to ensure ϕ is discharged, then the agent is
committed to ensuring ψ .
The following T-STIT theorem 6 clarifies how the previous definition of commitment
behaves in the case of Moore-like sentences of the form ϕ∧¬[i]ϕ: an agent is committed to
ensure that ϕ is true and that she does not see to it that ϕ if and only if the agent is committed
to do something inconsistent:
⊢T-STIT Ci : j (ϕ ∧ ¬[i]ϕ)↔ Ci : j⊥. (6)
The following T-STIT theorem 7 characterises the relationship between commitments
about logical equivalent formulas:
⊢T-STIT G∗(ϕ ↔ ψ)→ (Ci : jϕ ↔ Ci : jψ). (7)
This means that if ϕ and ψ are equivalent in all future worlds of every history passing
through the current moment, then agent i is committed to ensuring ϕ if and only if agent i is
committed to ensuring ψ . Note that the formula G∗ϕ captures a form of future necessity
or, even better, future inevitability. Therefore, theorem 7 captures the idea that if in the
future it is inevitable that ϕ and ψ have the same truth value, then one cannot be committed
to ensuring ϕ without being committed to ensuring ψ , and one cannot be committed to
ensuring ψ without being committed to ensuring ϕ.
The last T-STIT theorem considered here is the following one about the relationship
between time and commitment:
⊢T-STIT Ci : jϕ → F(¬[i]ϕ → Ci : jϕ). (8)
Since the Hilbert-style derivation of this T-STIT theorem is not trivial, I give it here:
1. ⊢ Ci : jϕ
def
= (¬F∗[i]ϕ → G∗vi, j ) ∧ ¬[i]ϕ.
2. ⊢ ((¬F∗[i]ϕ → G∗vi, j ) ∧ ¬[i]ϕ)→
([Agt](¬F∗[i]ϕ → G∗vi, j ) ∧ [Agt]¬[i]ϕ).
By Axiom (→ i), Axiom (i → Agt) and T-STIT theorem ¬[i]ϕ → [i]¬[i]ϕ.
3. ⊢ ([Agt](¬F∗[i]ϕ → G∗vi, j ) ∧ [Agt]¬[i]ϕ)→
[Agt]((¬F∗[i]ϕ → G∗vi, j ) ∧ ¬[i]ϕ).
By Axiom K for [Agt].
4. ⊢ [Agt]((¬F∗[i]ϕ → G∗vi, j ) ∧ ¬[i]ϕ)↔
[Agt](([i]ϕ ∨ F[i]ϕ ∨G∗vi, j ) ∧ ¬[i]ϕ).
5. ⊢ [Agt](([i]ϕ ∨ F[i]ϕ ∨G∗vi, j ) ∧ ¬[i]ϕ)→
[Agt](F[i]ϕ ∨G∗vi, j ).
By Axiom K for [Agt].
6. ⊢ [Agt](F[i]ϕ ∨G∗vi, j )→ [Agt](F[i]ϕ ∨Gvi, j ).
By Axiom K for [Agt].
7. ⊢ [Agt](F[i]ϕ ∨Gvi, j )→ F(F∗[i]ϕ ∨G∗vi, j ).
By the second T-STIT validity in Proposition 6.
8. ⊢ F(F∗[i]ϕ ∨G∗vi, j )→ F(¬F∗[i]ϕ → G∗vi, j ).
9. ⊢ F(¬F∗[i]ϕ → G∗vi, j )→
F(([i]ϕ ∨ ¬[i]ϕ) ∧(¬F∗[i]ϕ → G∗vi, j )).
By T-STIT theorem Fϕ → F(⊤ ∧ ϕ).
10. ⊢ F(([i]ϕ ∨ ¬[i]ϕ) ∧(¬F∗[i]ϕ → G∗vi, j ))→
F([i]ϕ ∨ Ci : jϕ).
11. ⊢ Ci : jϕ → F(¬[i]ϕ → Ci : jϕ).
From 1–10.
According to the previous T-STIT theorem 8, if agent i is committed to agent j to ensure
ϕ then, at some point in the future, either i will see to it that ϕ or i will remain committed
to j to ensure ϕ. This captures a kind of persistence of commitment over time.6 That is,
a commitment will persist as long as the committed agent does not perform the action to
which she is committed. Note that this property of commitment relies on the assumption
that there are no ‘external’ actions or processes that may cancel a pre-existent commitment
independently from the fact that the committed agent performs the action for which she
is committed. For instance, getting back to the above example, agent 1’s commitment to
agent 2 to review the articles could be dropped not only because 1 performs the action for
which is committed but also because 2 decides to cancel 1’s commitment by assigning
to a different programme committee member the reviews that were initially assigned
to 1.
4. Related work
The logic T-STIT presented in Section 2 differs in several aspects from the system proposed
by Wölf (2002). First of all, the language of T-STIT contains the operator [Agt] for the
joint action of the grand coalition, while the language of Wölf’s logic does not. I have
shown that the operator [Agt] is fundamental in order to characterise a basic property
relating action and time studied in STIT: the so-called property of no choice between
undivided histories. Moreover, different to the system of Wölf, T-STIT does not have
extra modal operators such as the difference operator  6= taken from de Rijke (1992),
where 6=ϕ means that ‘ϕ is true in all possible histories that are different from the
actual history’, and the modal operator ⊟ taken from Maio and Zanardo (1998), where
⊟ϕ means that ‘ϕ is true in all possible histories that belong to the current instant’. In this
sense, the language of T-STIT is more minimalistic than the language of Wölf’s logic, as
it contains only those operators which are strictly necessary for talking about tense and
action in an interesting way, while Wölf’s logic contains the preceding two extra modal
operators 6= and ⊟, which are not necessary for this. Wölf’s system and T-STIT are
also different at the semantic level. Wölf gives two semantics for his temporal variant of
STIT: one based on so-called T ×W -based agent frames, which are extensions of T ×W -
frames (Thomason, 1984), and the other based on so-called tree-based agent-frames, which
are similar to the BT+AC structures of Belnap et al. (2001). Wölf proves that the two
semantics are equivalent. The advantage of the T-STIT semantics given in Section 2.2,
compared to Wölf’s two semantics, is that the former is closer to the standard semantics
of modal logic (Blackburn et al., 2001), as it is based on the standard notion of Kripke
model with accessibility relations. A comparison between the semantics of T-STIT in
terms of temporal Kripke STIT models and Wölf’s two semantics is deferred to future
work.
T-STIT also differs from the system proposed by Broersen (Broersen, 2008a,b) under
several aspects. First of all, Broersen presents a variant of STIT called XSTIT in which the
temporal dimension and the agency dimension are fused to make up a single modal operator.
In particular, in Broersen’s logic there are primitive operators describing the effects of an
agent’s action in ‘next’ states, where ‘next’ refers to immediate successors of the present
state. On the contrary, in T-STIT, the temporal dimension and the agency dimension are
kept separate. Secondly, different to T-STIT, Broersen’s logic XSTIT does not have a future
tense operator. Thirdly, while the notion of group action used in T-STIT corresponds to the
notion of group action given by Horty (2001), the notion of group action in Broersen’s
XSTIT logic does not. According to Horty’s definition, the set of outcomes that is forced
by the joint action of a coalition is equal to the pointwise intersection of the sets of outcomes
that are forced by the individual actions of the agents in the coalition. In Broersen’s logic
only the left-to-right direction of Horty’s (2001) definition holds (i.e., the set of outcomes
that is forced by the individual action of an agent in a coalition is included in the set of
outcomes that is forced by the joint action of the coalition).
Another logic that is related to the logic T-STIT presented in Section 2 is
Schwarzentruber’s (2012) variant of STIT with discrete time extended with the tense
operator ‘next’of linear temporal logic (LTL). Schwarzentruber provides complexity results
for this logic without considering the issue of axiomatisation. However, the expressive
power of Schwarzentruber’s temporal variant of STIT is too limited for modelling normative
concepts such as achievement obligation and commitment. Indeed, the tense operator ‘next’
is insufficient to express temporal properties about commitments such as the fact that an
agent is committed to doing something in the future. On the contrary, as I have shown in
Section 3, the tense operator G (henceforth) allows us to express such properties.
5. Conclusion
I have presented in this work a temporal variant of STIT which supports reasoning about the
temporal properties of normative concepts such as achievement obligation and commitment.
A sound and complete axiomatisation for this logic has been given.
Directions of future work are manifold. I defer to future work an extension of the logic
T-STIT by the tense operators until and before of linear temporal logic (LTL; Gabbay et al.,
1980). With these operators it will be possible to provide a definition of commitment based
on the notion of deadline of the following form: agent i is committed to agent j to ensure
ϕ before the deadline ψ if and only if, if i does not see to it that ϕ before ψ becomes true,
then j will be wronged by i .
Another issue that I plan to investigate in future research is a comparison between
the Kripke-style semantics of T-STIT given in Section 2 and an alternative semantics for
T-STIT based on the original notion of the BT+AC structures of Belnap et al. (2001).
Indeed, while the two semantics are clearly equivalent in the case of atemporal individual
STIT and atemporal group STIT, one might wonder whether they lead to two different sets
of validities in the case of T-STIT and, if so, whether the validities differentiating the two
semantics capture interesting and intuitive properties.
Finally, on the technical side, I intend to provide an alternative axiomatisation of T-STIT
which does not make use of the Gabbay-style irreflexivity rule (IRR). Indeed, following
Zanardo (1996, Theorem 6.12), it seems possible to find such an alternative axiomatisation
in which the rule (IRR) is replaced with a set of more complex axiom schemas.
Another issue for future work is decidability of the satisfiability problem of T-STIT. It
has been proved by Herzig and Schwarzentruber (2008) that Horty’s group STIT with group
agency operators for all coalitions is undecidable. However, the logic T-STIT only has the
group agency operator for the grand coalition. Because of this limitation in the expressive
power of T-STIT, I believe that its satisfiability problem is decidable.
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Notes
1. The distinction between the ‘Ockhamist’ view and the ‘Peircean’ view of branching time was
proposed by Prior’s (1967) seminal work on the logic of time. According to the ‘Peircean’ view,
the truth of a temporal formula should be evaluated with respect either to some history or all
histories passing through a given moment. The ‘Ockhamist’ view considers a notion of actual
course of events. In particular, according to the ‘Ockhamist’ view, the truth of a temporal formula
should be evaluated with respect to a particular actual history passing through a given moment.
2. The function f is an order-isomorphism between RH(w) and RH(v) if and only if f is a bijective
function f : RH(w) −→ RH(v) with the property that for all u, u′ ∈ RH(w), (u, u′) ∈ RH if
and only if ( f (u), f (u′)) ∈ RH.
3. Xu (1998) considers a family of axiom schemas (AIAk ) for independence of agents of the form
(♦[1]ϕ1∧. . .∧♦[k]ϕk)→ ♦([1]ϕ1∧. . .∧[k]ϕk) that is parameterised by the integer k.As pointed
out by Belnap et al. (2001), (AIAk+1) implies (AIAk ). Therefore, as Agt is finite, in T-STIT the
family of axiom schemas can be replaced by the single axiom (AIA).
4. The notion of achievement obligation is traditionally opposed to the concept of maintenance
obligation (i.e., the obligation to maintain a given state of affairs ϕ).
5. Starting from Hohfeld (1917), in legal theory it is assumed that a right for j towards i that ϕ is
brought about by i typically correlates with a directed obligation for i towards j to bring about ϕ
(i.e., a duty of i towards j to bring about ϕ).
6. Note that a similar property of persistence characterises the notion of intention (Bratman, 1987)
and has been formally characterised in some logical theories of intention (Cohen & Levesque,
1990; Lorini & Herzig, 2006).
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